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NOTES
AN EVALUATION OF THE NEED FOR
FURTHER STATUTORY CONTROLS ON
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The level of foreign direct investment in the United States' has
risen dramatically in the past year. Unofficially, the Department
of Commerce estimates that more than two billion dollars of such
direct investment entered the United States in 1973, an amount
that is roughly triple the 708 million dollars invested in the United
States in 1972, and more than five times the 1971 figure. 2 The book
value of all foreign direct investment in the United States stood
at sixteen billion dollars at the end of 1973, an increase of 50 per
1. "Foreign direct investment in the United States" occurs when a foreign
investor gains control of the operation of an American company, either through
the acquisition of a controlling share of corporate stock, through the creation of
an American subsidiary or through the formation of a joint venture in the United
States. An investment in which the foreign investor lacks such control, whether
intentionally or not, is known as a "portfolio investment." The United States
Commerce Department uses a 25% ownership as the criterion for "control" in
these definitions. The Department, however, reportedly plans to change this test
to require a 20% ownership in the future for its determinations of foreign direct
investment. Statement of Peter M. Flaniganat Hearings on ForeignDirect Investment in the United States Before the Subcomm. on ForeignEconomic Policy
of the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 5, 1974) (prepublication transcript) [hereinafter cited as Flanigan Statement]. See also F.
RoOT, R. KRAMER, & M. D'ARLIN, INTERNAToNAL TRADE AND FINANCE 459 (1966).
2. Wall Street J., Jan. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 6. The accuracy of this figure is
disputable because of the lack of procedures by which the entry of foreign direct
investment may be measured. Two recent private analyses have suggested that
this total for the year 1973 should be estimated conservatively at $3 billion. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 39, col. 7 (report by David Bauer, an international
economist with the Conference Board, a non-profit research organization);
Statement of Jeffrey Arpan and David Ricks at Hearings on ForeignDirect Investment in the United States Before the Subcomm. on ForeignEconomicPolicy
of the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 5, 1974) (prepublication transcript) [hereinafter cited as Arpan Statement].
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cent in just five years.3 This massive influx of foreign capital has
taken many different forms in a variety of economic sectors. The
bulk of this inward flow is invested in direct plant construction and
expansion, and is concentrated most heavily in the fields of electrical and non-electrical machinery, chemicals and scientific equipment.4 For example, the American subsidiary of Farbwerke
Hoechst AG, the West German chemical producer, proposes to
build'a 100 million dollar petrochemical complex in Texas.' Foreign interests also have engaged in numerous successful stock acquisitions, such as the British takeover of Gimbels Bros. department stores.' Real estate, particularly resort properties, are yet
another area of sizeable foreign investment. Japanese purchases of
properties in Hawaii reportedly have surpassed 300 million dollars
in value.7 In addition, reports of existing or planned investments
by the newly rich Arab nations now are circulating widely. s
A multitude of factors account for this surge of foreign investment in the United States. Realizing the desirability of access to
the huge and rapidly expanding American market, foreign firms
3. Wall Street J., Jan. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 6. Foreign direct investment in the
United States stood at $10.8 billion at the end of 1968. FlaniganStatement, supra
note 1, at Appendix, Table Ell-A.
4. In a recent survey, 86% of the responding firms from abroad entered the
American market for capital investment by creating entirely new subsidiaries
rather than by acquiring existing companies. In addition, 45% of all foreign direct
investment in the United States was concentrated in four basic industries: electrical machinery (14%), non-electrical machinery (13%), chemicals (9%) and scientific equipment (9%). Arpan Statement, supra note 2, at 5; Wall Street J., Feb.
18, 1974, at 39, col. 7.
5. Wall Street J., March 22, 1974, at 3, col. 2.
6. Other well-known firms now under foreign control include Grand Union Co.
(supermarkets) and TraveLodge International, Inc. (motels). Many companies,
such as Thos. J. Lipton, Inc. (tea) and Lever Bros. (soaps) long have been owned
by foreign interests. Id., Jan. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at
39, col. 7.
7. Japanese governmental approval for investment in United States real estate totalled over 47 million dollars between July 1971 and March 1973, of which
more than 40 million dollars went into resort and other commercial real estate.
Statement of Nelson A. Stitt at HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ForeignEconomic Policy of the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb.
5, 1974) (pre-publication statement) [hereinafter cited as Stitt Statement].
8. See, e.g., Wall Street J., March 5, 1974, at 1, col. 6 and Jan. 22, 1974, at 1,
col. 6.
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are beginning to recognize the growing economic benefits of production in the United States through direct capital investment-direct, tariff-free access to consumers; protection from any
future trade barriers; and avoidance of competitive labor costs and
rapidly escalating shipping costs, among others.9 The two devaluations of the dollar by the United States Government since 19710
and the endemic inflation abroad" have recently heightened these
benefits and contributed to a rise in direct investment in the
United States. The continued depressed prices of American corporate stock, in turn, make foreign acquisition of United States stock
and companies a much less expensive proposition than
previously. 12 Active encouragement of foreign direct investment by
state and federal governments, through such promotional devices
as development seminars, overseas offices, and tax breaks, assuredly has contributed to foreign interest in American investment
opportunities. 3 Lastly, since the 1930's and the debacle of the
protectionist Hawley-Smoot Tariff, 4 the United States has pursued a liberal trade policy encouraging the free flow of goods and
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 39, col. 7; Statement of Thos. L. Farmer,at
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ForeignEconomic Policy of the House Comm.
on ForeignAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. Feb. 5, 1974 (pre-publication transcript)
[hereinafter cited as FarmerStatement].
10. Largely in response to continued and worsening deficits in United States
international balance of payments, the United States Government formally devalued the dollar in December 1971 and February 1973. Wall Street J., March 22,
1974, at 6, col. 3. As of April 19, 1974, furthermore, the effective value of the dollar
dropped even lower to 1.59% below the last devaluation, and 7.16% below the
rates of December 1971. Wall Street J., April 5, 1974, at 22, col. 2 and April 19,
1974, at 4, col. 2.
11. Most industrialized European nations in recent years have suffered inflation at rates exceeding 7%. In addition, during 1973 those levels generally rose to
above 8%. Recently inflation in the United States, while usually below that of
Europe, has soared to greater than 9%. Wall Street J., March 13, 1974, at 1, col.
6.
12. Between April 1972, and March 1974, the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
a standard indicator of the health of the stock market, dropped 100 points. Wall
Street J., April 4, 1972, at 1, col. 2, and March 29, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
13. See notes 151-54 infra and accompanying text.
14. The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, as amended 19 U.S.C.
§ §1202-1654 (1964), raised the average tariff level to 51% ad valorem, the highest
level since the 1828 Tariff of Abominations. Note, The Trade Act of 1971, 80 YALE
L.J. 1418, 1425 (1971).
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capital among the nations of the world. 15 A limited number of
domestic statutory restrictions on foreign direct investment in the
United States naturally has accompanied this policy. To protect
essential national interest, federal statutes prohibit or severely restrict foreign direct investment in the areas of aviation, atomic
energy, federal land mining, hydroelectric, power development,
public utilities, radio communication and coastal shipping. 6 Many
stateg, however, similarly limit foreign control of realty, banks and
insurance companies." Except for these restrictions, foreign investors enjoy national treatment, having the same opportunities as
American investors.
The most critical result flowing from this sudden surge of direct
investment into the United States has been the adverse reaction,
particularly among members of the press and of the United States
Congress." Negative opinions about the expansion of direct foreign
participation in the American economy have ranged from xenophobic fears of a foreign economic takeover of the United States to
more responsible concerns for the possible need to inhibit foreign
penetration of certain critical industries and raw material sectors.
These fears and negative reactions have been exacerbated by a
paucity of available information to verify or rebut them. A number
of congressional committees, therefore, have responded by scheduling investigatory hearings on foreign direct investment, 9 while
15. The President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy (the Williams Commission) in its July 1971, report endorsed the "traditional
U.S. open door to direct investment in the United States. The U.S. has much to
gain from an inflow of foreign resources ....

[I]t is essential that we treat

foreign investors in the same manner as we expect and press other host countries
to treat U.S. investors." FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at 4.
16. See notes 58-72 infra and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§33-395, 33-396 (1958) (banks and
insurance companies); N.C. GEN. STAT. §64-3 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE §§6-02-

02, 6-08-27,10-23-01 (1959) (banks and foreign corporations), §§26-01-13 to 26-0115 (1970) (insurance companies); and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §121 (1971) (alien
ownership of land).
18. See, e.g., Wall Street J., Jan. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 6; Nashville Banner,
March 18, 1974, at 7, col. 3; and Tennessean, March 11, 1974, at 6, col. 1, which
publicize the adverse reactions in Congress and in the press to growing foreign
direct investment.
19. Wall Street J., Jan. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 6. Those congressional subcommittees that have conducted hearings on foreign direct investment are the Subcom-
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several members of Congress recently have sponsored legislation in
this area. Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), has introduced legislation calling for a massive two-year study of foreign direct investment in the United States to gain the information necessary
to formulate a "coherent national policy" toward the inflow of such
capital." More directly, however, Representatives John Dent
(D-Pa.) and John Moss, (D-Calif.) have sponsored bills in Congress that would sharply limit future foreign direct investment by
restricting foreign acquisition of existing American corporate
2,
stock.
This sharp increase in foreign direct investment in the United
States, together with the negative reactions among responsible
men in the press and government, has posed the difficult and
complex question whether it is in the best economic and political
interests of the United States to maintain its present policy of
allowing a largely unrestricted inflow of foreign direct investment.
This Note examines this question in light of the three congressional
bills previously mentioned and offers recommendations for a desirable course for United States policy. Part II treats United States
trade and investment policy and the statutes regulating foreign
direct investment. A comparison of American practice and policy
with that of other comparably industrialized nations comprises the
third part of this Note. Part IV examines in depth the reasons for
mittee on International Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs. See 120 CONG. REc. D14, D21 (Jan. 23 and Feb. 21, 1974); the
Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Commerce Committee (unconfirmed reports in advance of hearings on Feb. 19 and March 7, 1974
in the Congressional Record); and, the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. See also 120 CONG. REc. D34, D70,
D124 (Jan. 29, Feb. 21 and March 5, 1974).
20. S. 2840, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
21. H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (a bill to amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to restrict persons who are not citizens of the United States
from acquiring more than 35 per centum of the nonvoting securities or more than
5 per centum of the voting securities of any issuer whose securities are registered
under such Act, and for other purposes), proposed by Congressman Dent and his
co-sponsor, Joseph M. Gaydos of Pennsylvania; H.R. 12040, 93d Cong., lst Sess.
(1973) (bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prevent control by
foreign persons of American companies engaged in vital industries), proposed by
Congressman Moss. See 119 CONG. REc. E8188 (1973) for explanatory remarks by
Mr. Moss.
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the recent growth in foreign direct investment in the United States
and its present and prospective nature and extent. Part V concludes with an analysis-built upon the observations in the earlier
sections of the Note-of the political and economic repercussions
in the United States caused by the entry of foreign direct investment, and suggests conclusions for appropriate United States policy.
II.

UNITED STATES TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE

A. An HistoricalOverview
Until the first part of the twentieth century, the two distinct
components of United States trade policy followed opposing economic philosophies-a protectionist tariff program against the
importation of goods and products, and a policy favoring foreign
direct investment in the American economy.2 With few exceptions, the United States had always utilized high tariffs as a
method to protect the nation's infant, but growing, industries from
cheaper, and perhaps more efficiently produced, foreign products.? As early as 1791, however, Alexander Hamilton stated, "Instead of being viewed as a rival, [foreign direct investment] ought
to be considered as a most valuable auxiliary, conducing to put
into motion a greater quantity of productive labor, and a greater
portion of useful enterprise than could exist without it.''24 This
remark sets forth the historical, and still operative, liberal policy
of American government toward foreign direct investment. From
the very earliest times, foreign capital was an essential part of
American economic development because of the inadequacy of
22. S. Metzger, American Foreign Policy and American Foreign Trade, 47
TEXAS L. REv. 1075 (1969); Note, 80 YALE L. J. 1418 (1971); Weintraub, Why the
United States Welcomes ForeignInvestments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE
ON FOREIGN DIRECT IvFs i Nr IN mE UNITED STATES 8 (1970) (sponsored by the
Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown University)
[hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
23. 80 YALE L.J. 1424; E. ROOT,supra note 1, at 374-77.
24. Weintraub, supranote 22, at 8. See also Hamilton, Report of the Secretary
of the Treasury on the Subject of Manufactures, in STATE PAPERS AND SPEECHES
ON THE TARIFF 1 (F. Taussig ed. 1895), as cited in Note, supra note 14, at 1423
n.23.
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domestic capital and resources to create a developed economy.
Foreign investment in the United States totaled 1.5 billion dollars
by 1869, and was crucial in many ways to the nation's economic
development.5 For example, the development of the transcontinental railroad system and the western lands during the latter half
of the nineteenth century depended heavily on foreign capital participation. Indeed, it would not be incorrect to acknowledge that
the American West was won with American sweat and European
capital.26 By 1914, the United States had grown sufficiently enough
to invest 2.7 billion dollars abroad,2 yet foreign investment in
America had soared to 5.9 billion dollars in portfolio securities and
real estate, and 7.2 billion dollars in direct investment.28 The financial needs of the European belligerents during World War I caused
such a substantial liquidation of foreign holdings in America that
in 1919 the relative sizes of American investment abroad and for29
eign capital in the United States had reversed their 1914 figures.
Foreign direct investment in the United States since then has
grown at a sporadic rate and has failed to match the extraordinary
world-wide expansion of United States direct investment, which is
now seven times greater than the total of all foreign direct investment in the United States. 0 Except in areas of essential national
interest, governmental policy continues strongly to support nondiscrimination against foreign investors in the United States. The
government consistently justifies this liberal position on grounds
of the nation's commitment to free world trade and the economic
benefits accruing to the United States in greater productivity,
higher incomes, greater inflow of technology and a more favorable
effect on the balance of payments."
25. FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at Appendix Table XIV (United States
Investments Abroad and Foreign Investments in the United States, 1869-1972).
26. Weintraub, supra note 22, at 8.
27. FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at Appendix, Table XIV.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at Appendix, Table XIV.
31. Id. at 13. In his April 10, 1973 message to Congress concerning the Trade
Reform Act, President Nixon noted that "an open system for international investment, one which eliminates artificial incentives or impediments here and abroad,
offers great promise for improved prosperity throughout the world." Id. at 3.
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Modern Economic Objectives of American Policy

United States protectionist trade policy peaked disastrously in
the controversial Tariff Act of 1930,32 known as the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff and labeled the "crowning achievement of protectionism.",
This tariff's record-high protection against imports-provoked a
flood of retaliatory tariff legislation among United States trading
partners that reduced both the American share of international
trade, and world trade itself, by almost one-third between 1929 and
1933.11 This trade protectionism, contributing significantly to the
subsequent world economic depression, thereafter caused an almost complete reversal of United States trade and investment policy. Consequently, the perceived domestic economic benefits flowing from the free and largely unrestricted flow of trade and investment have ever since comprised the chief justification for the contemporary "liberal" trade policy pursued by the United States
Government. Moreover, since then, the unrestricted movement of
goods in domestic and international trade is believed to engender
the optimal allocation of resources among national economic units.
A rationalization of resource allocation, in turn, produces the desirable economic benefits of greater and more efficient productivity
through production specialization in which costs are lowest. In
addition, technological advancements are more rapid because
most efficient production is best able to bear such costs. Efficiency
in allocation and production naturally should create real economic
benefits to the populace in lower prices for goods and in higher
incomes. Higher employment in the long-term should also follow
from this economic chain. A liberal trade policy, moreover, if practiced on a world scale, creates greatly expanded markets for Ameri35
can goods and investment.
The efficacy with which a liberal economic policy serves the
goals of United States foreign policy has constituted another effective argument in favor of trade liberalization." Since World War
32. See note 14 supra.
33. F. ROOT, supra note 1, at 377.
34. Id.; Note, supra note 14, at 1425.
35. B. BALASSA, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AMONG INDUSTRIAL CoUNTRIEs 94-148
(1967); F. RoOT, supra note 1, at 47-118.
36. S. Metzger, supranote 22, at 1078-84; FlaniganStatement, supra note 1,
at 3, 7-9, 14, 17-19.
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II, containment of Communism has been a vital factor in American
foreign policy. The unrestricted flow of trade and investment that
a liberal trade program encourages is a natural adjunct to American foreign policy because it promotes economic and political interdependence among the non-Communist world and reduces the
threat of Russian influence. The United States, therefore, has
sought to maximize the utility of free trade through such means
as agreements to reduce tariffs,' 7 free trade areas, expansion of
United States trade and investment and the growth of American
multinational corporations.38
C. Federal Statutes Implementing Post-1930 United States
Trade Policy
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act 9 enacted by Congress in
1934 marked the adoption by the United States Government of a
liberal trade program and was the precursor of a continuous series
of American and world measures that have successively lowered
trade barriers among the developed nations. The Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act granted the President extraordinary authority to
conclude, without Senate approval, bilateral trade agreements to
lower tariff rates in an amount up to 50 per cent of the HawleySmoot tariff barriers.'" Amended during the 1950's to protect
United States industries through the addition of several protectionist measures,4 the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act governed
37. See notes 49-53 infra and accompanying text.
38. See generally Vagts, The MultinationalEnterprise:A New Challenge for
TransnationalLaw, 83 HARv.L. Rxv. 739 (1970).
39. Ch.474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
40. Trade Agreements Act, ch. 474, §§350(a)(1)-(2), 48 Stat. 943 (1934),
amending 46 Stat. 708 (1930). The President, however, was required to "seek
information and advice" of the Tariff Commission with respect to these reductions, and consult the Departments of State, Agriculture and Commerce. Trade
Agreements Act, ch. 474, §350(a)(2), 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
41. The most important of these amending provisions were the "peril-point
provision," which required the Tariff Commission to set minimum tariff rates
below which domestic industries might be harmed (Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951, ch. 141, §3, 65 Stat. 72); the "escape clause provision," to be inserted
in all agreements and which would permit the withdrawal of all concessions that
should prove harmful to domestic industries (Trade Agreements Extension Act
of 1951, ch. 141, §6(a), 65 Stat. 72); and, the "defense essentiality amendment,"
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American bilateral trade relations until 1962 and reduced ad
valorem American tariff rates from an average of 51.5 per cent for
dutiable imports in 1934 to 11.1 per cent in 1962.42 In the landmark
Trade Expansion Act of 1962,11 which supplanted the Reciprocal
Trade Act and constituted another giant step in the liberalization
of United States trade policies, Congress granted the Executive the
following: (1) the power to reduce, by as much as 50 per cent, the
customs duties existing as of July 1, 1962; (2) the power to eliminate all tariff barriers on the products of industries in which the
United States and the European Economic Community (EEC)
together controlled 80 per cent of the free world trade; and (3) the
power to eliminate tariff duties that, as of July 1, 1962, were at
levels of five per cent or less.4 Of particular note is the limitation
imposed by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 on the presidential
authority to issue emergency restrictive measures, such as higher
duties or quantitative limitations, whenever foreign political or
economic action might injure American interests. Instead, the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provided various forms of governmental assistance to beleaguered industries in such situations."
Since the expiration of the Trade Expansion Act in 1967,46 the
United States has had no statutory trade policy despite numerous
efforts to legislate one. The proposed Trade Act of 1971, which
exhibited the then burgeoning protectionist sentiment, failed to
gain congressional approval.47 The Congress presently is considering a new trade bill that would prepare the United States for
further world tariff reduction and reaffirm United States dedication to free trade."6
a provision to protect the endangered national security by reducing imports of
harmful foreign goods (F. RooT, supra note 1, at 380). See Note, supra note 14,
at 1427-30 for an elaboration and evaluation of these amendments.
42. F. RooT, supra note 1, at 381-84, 388.
43. 19 U.S.C. §§1801-1991 (1970).
44. See 19 U.S.C. §§1821(b)(1), 1822, 1831(a) (1970); F. RooT, supra note 1,
at 391-92.
45. The government was empowered to provide technical and financial assistance to affected firms and to provide workers with allowances for retraining,
relocation and adjustment. Note, supra note 14, at 1430-32.
46. F. RooT, supra note 1, at 396.
47. See Note, supra note 14.
48. H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), known as the Trade Reform Act
of 1974.
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United States InternationalTrade and Investment Policy:An
Instrument of Foreign Policy

The United States has employed a variety of devices and strategies to gain a freer flow of world trade and the concomitant foreign
policy benefits of economic and political interdependence among
the non-Communist nations. First, the United States has helped
create a number of post-World War H economic agreements and
institutions that promote greater trade and economic cooperation.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)," perhaps
the best known of these organizations, has emerged as the central
international trade institution of the post-war period. The commitment of GATT's members to trade liberalization is exemplified by
the GATT preamble that calls for "the substantial reduction of
tariffs" and "the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce" to gain the full economic benefits propounded
therein." In operation the GATT has sponsored five major trade
conferences, the last being the so-called "Kennedy Round" in Geneva between 1964 and 1967. The Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, entered into by the United States under the authority of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, produced the most significant trade
liberalization in American history.51 Other cooperative institutions
that have served economic and political functions similar to GATT
are the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.52 Secondly, most bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation between the United States and its major world trading partners require each contracting party to grant full national treatment
to investors from the other.53 Thirdly, the United States has always
49. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter cited as GATT].
50. See Note, note 14 supra, at 1428 n.53.
51. See GATT.
52. See generally F. RoOr, supra note 1, at 354-59 (International Monetary
Fund), 365-66 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), 449
(the World Bank).
53. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, arts. V, VII, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No.
3593 (effective July 14, 1956). Article VIE does limit this right of national treatment in certain areas in which aliens may not carry on, establish or acquire
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advocated the creation of economic free trade areas and customs
unions such as the Common Market because such entities ideally
increase the flow of intra-market and world trade, and consequently make the participants stronger economic and political allies of the United States. 4 Fourthly, the United States has sought
to increase trade with and financial assistance to the less developed nations through such means as preferential treatment under
the GATT." Fifthly, the world expansion of American economic,
and often political, influence through the growth of multinational
corporations, incorporated in the United States, has received warm
governmental support. 6 Lastly, the American Government occasionally has applied direct economic pressure, such as with Japan
in 1971, to force the liberalization of foreign trade and investment
regulations."
E. Domestic Federal Statutory Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment
The limited number of federal statutes inhibiting foreign direct
investment illustrates the continuing United States policy to accord foreign investors "national treatment" on an equal footing
with domestic corporate entities and investors. Based solely on
grounds of essential national security and international practice,
statutory limitations protect coastal and internal shipping,"8 domestic radio communication," atomic energy,60 domestic air transportation,6" minerals under federal lands62 and hydroelectric
enterprises: communications, air and water transport, taking and administering
trusts, banking involving depositary functions, or the exploitation of land and
natural resources.
54. See B. BALASSA, supra note 35, at 23-43; Metzger, supra note 22, at 108081.
55. GATT, supra note 49, at art. 24.
56. See generally B. BALASSA, supra note 35, at 23-43.
57. H. TANIKAWA, D. ALLAN, M. HisCOCK & D. RoEBUCK, CREDrr AND SECURITY
INJAPAN

10 (1973). The latest measures of liberalization in Japanese investment

policy were introduced directly in response to United States withdrawal of tariff
concessions. Id.
58. 46 U.S.C. §§289, 808, 865, 883 (1970).

59.
60.
61.
62.

47
42
49
30

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§310 (1970).
§2133 (1970).
§§1301(13), 1378(c), 1378(f), 1401, 1508(b) (1970).
§§22, 24, 72, 181, 352 (1970); 43 U.S.C. §§3102-3300 (1970).
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power. 13 The degree and complexity of restriction imposed in these
statutes varies greatly. All of them require United States citizenship of the applicable person or entity. The most inhibitory regulation governs commercial licenses for the use of atomic energy; no
license will be granted to "an alien, or any corporation or entity of
whom the Commissioner knows, or has reason to believe is owned,
controlled or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a
foreign government."64 Slightly less strict prohibitions govern the
development of hydroelectric power on navigable streams and mining of federal lands. 5 Most of these statutes, however, allow a
minority percentage of foreign stock ownership." Registration for
operation of aircraft between points within the United States, and
of ships for transportation of merchandise in coastal or internal
commerce requires that an applicant be a United States citizen,
and if the applicant is an aviation or shipping corporation, both
the chief executive officer and either two-thirds (for aviation corporations)17 or a majority (for shipping corporations)68 of the board of
directors must be United States citizens, with 75 per cent of its
stock owned or controlled by individual United States citizens."
To obtain a license to engage in radio communications, a corporate
applicant must have no foreign officers or directors and no more
than 20 per cent foreign ownership of stock, or the corporate applicant must not be directly or indirectly controlled by another corporation any of whose officers, or more than 25 per cent of whose
directors, are aliens, or of which more than 25 per cent of the stock
is owned by aliens.70 The severity and breadth of these statutory
limitations may yield, nevertheless, in certain instances to circumvention and available exceptions. The required United States citizenship may be satisfied by a foreign investor that engages in
United States business activity through an American subsidiary
incorporated for these purposes. Foreign corporations engaged in
mining and manufacturing operations enjoy a special exception to
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

16 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
See notes
Id.
49 U.S.C.
46 U.S.C.
See notes
47 U.S.C.

§797(e) (1970).
§2133 (1970).
62, 63 supra.
§1301 (1970) (aviation).
§808 (1970) (shipping).
67, 68 supra.
§310 (1970).
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the restrictions on coastal and internal shipping.7' Domestic
United States air commerce, furthermore, is open to foreign civil
aircraft, upon a grant of reciprocity by the other nation concerned,
so long as such aircraft do not carry for compensation or hire any
persons or property going aboard within and destined for another
point within the United States.7 2
A host of domestic regulatory statutes of general applicability
pose additional problems for foreign investors and lessen their desire and ability to locate or invest here. A fear uppermost in the
minds of foreign corporate investors is potential injunctive action
against them by the Federal Trade Commission for alleged anticompetitive practices. Foreign corporations seeking to acquire control of domestic entities are especially wary of this police power
because it can be utilized both before and after a transaction, and,
therefore, lends more uncertainty to an already risky venture.7
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has shown itself ready to
wield its anti-competitive stick, as in the now successful British
Petroleum acquisition of a 25 per cent interest in Standard Oil
Company of Ohio,74 and its recent inquiry into the 1970 acquisition
by Nestle Alimentana S.A., the giant Swiss food and beverage
concern, of majority control in Libby, McNeil & Libby, and its
purchase of Stouffer Corp. in March 1973. 75 Despite American
claims that the FTC does not discriminate against foreign investors, FTC investigations have aroused considerable protest from
76
abroad as well as threats of retaliation.
Any apparent discrimination may be explained, moreover, by
71. 46 U.S.C. §883-1 (1970).
72. 49 U.S.C. §1508(b) (1970).
73. 15 U.S.C. §45 (1970). See also Remarks by J.J.A. Ellis, former Attorney
General of the Netherlands, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 12. In general, as
the Commission of the European Economic Community noted recently, "It is
often noted that the non-U.S. investors encounter numerous difficulties in setting
up in the U.S.A. and that U.S. regulations are substantially more stringent with
regard to European investment than are the European regulations with regard to
U.S. investment." FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at 17.

74. Remarks by Sir Eric Drake, Chairman of the Board of British Petroleum
Co., Ltd., in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 6.

75. Wall Street J., March 19, 1974, at 18, col. 2. In addition, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) recently has moved to revoke the acquisition by British Oxygen Co. of 35% of the stock of Airco, Inc. Id., Feb. 27, 1974, at 10, col. 2.
76. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 6, 12. The FTC inquiry into the acquisi-
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the perceived risks of foreign investment in the United States
which have militated against acquisitions except by the largest,
American-style foreign multinational-the entities naturally most
susceptible to FTC inquiry. The practical necessity for registration
of transactions in equity capital with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) similarly arouses concern and perhaps leads to
avoidance of American investment since the rigorous disclosure
expected in SEC registration statements is a new and painful experience for most foreign investors.77 Another obstruction is the requirement of governmental approval for mergers or acquisitions in
most realms of industrial activity.7" The public hearings customarily held by most American regulatory agencies may act as a touchstone for public rejection, as may the agency's required determination of whether the application is in the public interest. 9 Investment in domestic entities that seek government contracts also
raises problems for foreign investors because contracts that involve
access to or development of classified information require security
clearance of all relevant corporate officers."0 Further, the extensive

tions by Nestle prompted its chairman, Pierre Liotard-Vogt, to suggest that the
FTC, contrary to Nixon Administration policy, is trying to create trouble for the
establishment of foreign companies in the United States. Wall Street J., March
19, 1974, at 18, col. 2. Chairman Liotard-Vogt, furthermore, warned of possible
foreign retaliation to American restrictions on inward foreign investment. Wall
Street J., March 25, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
77. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 7 (remarks by Sir Eric Drake).
78. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §824 (1970) (utilities); 49 U.S.C. §5(a) (1970) (railroad
companies and motor carriers); 46 U.S.C. §808 (1970) (shipping); 49 U.S.C.
§1378(a)(4) (1970) (aviation controls).
79. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §5 (1970) (the procedures for approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission).
80. Since security clearance for governmental contracts usually is granted by
the government to United States citizens only, corporations having foreigners in
key positions, therefore, may be unable to gain clearance for the contracts.
Farmer Statement, supra note 9, at 11. Defense Department practice to treat
private contractors as ineligible for security clearance if the contractor, or its
parent corporation, is under foreign ownership, control of or influence may be
circumvented by using voting trusts that insulate the contractor from such foreign
ownership, influence or control.,Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft AG, of Liechtenstein,
used this method in its efforts to overcome possible objections to its acquisition,
by stock tender offer, of a 51% interest in Ronson, Inc. Wall Street J., Jan. 21,
1974, at 19, col. 1.
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state and federal power of taxation over corporate income must be
evaluated by foreign investors for its effect on the viability of
American investment. In addition, many states have restricted
such investments in banking, insurance and realty transactions."1
The methods by which the United States may control the entry of
foreign direct investment, therefore, actually extend far beyond
the direct statutory limitations in the enumerated "critical" areas.
III. FOREIGN STATUTORY CONTROL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

A.

Introduction

Statutes that directly regulate the entry of foreign capital for
direct investment are common throughout the world. No international standard, or rule of international law, exists against which
to measure these statutes, and their stringency varies greatly. Recent tides of nationalistic fervor have sparked increasingly strict
controls on such foreign investment, particularly among, though
not limited to, the less developed nations. The requirements that
all future foreign direct investments be limited to minority interests, and that nationals acquire majority control within fifteen
years in all such existing investment, as stated in the Investment
Code of the Andean Common Market, are typical of such new
measures." The applicable statutes in force in the developed nations generally are much less inhibitory than those of the less developed countries and range from extensive discretionary restrictions to virtually no limitations whatsoever. Common to the methods of most of these nations is supervision of foreign direct investment in both existing companies and newly created entities or
subsidiaries. Other typical features found more extensively in
other industrialized nations are the absolute bar to entry of foreign
capital in certain sectors and the existence of governmental monopolies or companies that severely reduce the opportunity for
private competition. Utilities, communications and transit systems typify these governmentally controlled areas. 3 Foreign stat81.

See note 17 supra.

82. Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign
Investments, 5 VAND. J. TRNSNAT'L L. 313,315 (1972).
23, 116 (Germany) 1973, 23, 615 (Britain)
83. 3 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP.
1973, 22, 623 (France) (1974).
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utes of general applicability that are not solely intended to govern
foreign direct investment also act as potential barriers. This sort
of legislation either applies to foreigners in general, as in tax, work
permit, personnel hiring, equipment import and financing controls, or to both domestic and foreign entities. Antitrust and incorporation laws, as well as labor standards, fall under this latter
category. 4
B.

Statutory Controls in a Representative Group of Developed
Nations

Of particular relevance to an understanding of the controls exercised by the United States over foreign direct investment is an
examination of foreign statutes of a similar nature currently in
force in comparably industrialized nations. Canada, France,
Japan, West Germany and the United Kindgom constitute a representative sample, which conveniently may be divided into two
groups according to the severity of restrictions: Japan, France and
Canada are less open to foreign direct investment than are West
Germany and the United Kingdom. Following an elaboration of
the statutory controls used by members of these two groups, this
Note offers comments explaining the political and economic forces
that appear responsible for these statutes.
1. Japan.-Foreigndirect investors encounter in Japan a relatively comprehensive and complex system controlling the entry of
foreign capital, notwithstanding a governmental program of liberalization in this area since 1967. s5 Under the Law Concerning Foreign Investment,"8 virtually all direct investments by foreigners"
84. King, ForeignRestrictions on U.S. Investment, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27,
36-43 (1973).
85. See generally CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DoING BusINEss IN Tm FAR EAST
(R. Allison, ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DOING BusINEsS]; INTERNATIONAL FiNANCE BUREAU, JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, BANK OF
JAPAN, MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN JAPAN (1974) [hereinafter cited as

MANUAL]; TANIKAWA, supra note 57; King, supra note 84; Michida, CapitalLiberalizationas a Treaty Questionand Offensive and Defensive StrategiesConcerning
Foreign Capital, 2 LAw IN JAPAN 1 (1968).
86. "Foreign investors" include nonresident non-juridical persons, juridical
persons and other organizations established under the laws of foreign countries,
and the following: (1) branch offices, branch factories, etc., in Japan of corporations established under the laws of foreign countries; (2) resident non-Japanese
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require governmental sanction from the Ministry of Finance and
other "competent ministries." "Direct investment" is defined as
an acquisition made to obtain participation in the management of
existing or newly created companies, or as a transaction involving
the establishment in Japan of a branch of a foreign enterprise.,,
The discretion that these authorities may exercise under this statute is great, for the creation of a serious problem affecting the
national economy may justify rejection of an investment. Reportedly, the Japanese Government uses this power liberally. 9 Additionally, foreign direct investment in a branch or directly operated
factory requires the filing of a registration statement with the Bank
0 Automatic validation of an incoming direct investment
of Japan.1
in an existing or newly created enterprise, is possible, however,
depending on the industry involved, the percentage of stock ownership sought and compliance with certain conditions. These standards vary directly according to whether the investment concerns
the creation of a new Japanese subsidiary or joint venture, or the
acquisition of stock in an existing company, and they demonstrate
an obvious governmental preference for maintaining national control of existing enterprises. Foreign investors automatically may
hold complete ownership of a new company except in 22 protected
industries, including data processing, real estate and drugs, to
which the government has not yet extended full liberalization."
nationals, overseas residents with both Japanese and foreign nationality (dual
nationality); and (3) Japanese corporations whose stocks or proprietary interests
are wholly owned by nonresidents, corporations established under the laws of
foreign countries, and residents not having Japanese nationality, or whose management is virtually controlled by such. MANUAL, supra note 85, at 1 n.1.
87. The Law Concerning Foreign Investment was enacted in 1950 to deal

specifically with the entry of long-term foreign direct investment. It supplements
the pre-existing Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law that governs
all foreign exchange and trade. MANUAL, supra note 85, at 1-2. Except in minor
cases, the "competent ministers" must consult the Foreign Investment Council,
a body of fifteen men of knowledge and experience that is appointed by the

Minister of Finance. Id. at 4.
88. MANUAL, supra note 85, at 6, 8, 14.
89. Id. at 4. DOING BusINEss, supra note 85, at 22-27.
90. This statement must be supplemented by a business prospectus and annual reports on the settlement of the branch's accounts. MANUAL, supra note 85,

at 13.
91. Id. at 8. The complete list of protected industries may be found in
MANUAL, supra note 85, apps. 1-2.
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This "automatic" validation, nevertheless, hinges upon compliance with certain conditions, among which are the prohibition of
any transfer of business from, or future combination with, an existing company. 2 In 16 of those 22 industries, foreign participation
may reach 50 per cent if accompanied by satisfaction of a lengthier
set of conditions.13 In the remaining protected industries, a single
foreign investor may acquire less than 10 per cent equity interest,
as long as the total foreign investment in the industry is less than
25 per cent. 4 For existing Japanese corporations not in the 22
protected industries, foreign investors may acquire 100 per cent of
a company's stock as long as the company consents to the acquisition. Absent this consent, a foreign direct investment in such a
company receives automatic validation only if a foreign investor
individually acquires less than 10 per cent of the stock and the
aggregate number of shares so held is less than 25 per cent. In a
wide range of certain restricted sectors, such as utilities and banking, the limit of total foreign stock ownership, however, is fifteen
per cent. 5 In cases in which automatic approval may not occur, the
investor is subjected to thorough screening, and consequently, government validation is less likely."
2. France.-Like Japan, France mandates prior governmental
approval for all foreign direct investments by "foreign investors,"
including French companies under foreign control and French
branches of foreign corporate entities. In France foreign direct
investments consist of the purchase, creation or extension of any
new or existing enterprise or branch, excluding initial acquisitions
of less than twenty per cent stock interests in existing French
companies.9" Certain sizeable foreign borrowings also may fall
92. Id. app. 3(B).
93. Id. app. 3(A).
94. Id. at 8-9.
95. MANUAL, supra note 85, at 9-10. A complete list of the "restricted industries" includes such typically protected areas as all forms of transportation,
communications, fishing and mining. Id. at 7.
96. MANuAL, supra note 85, at 10.
97. See 3 CCH Co¢mi. MKT. REP.; R. DIcKiE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: FRANCE
(1970); Torem & Craig, Developments in the Control of ForeignInvestment in
France,70 MICH. L. REv. 285 (1971).

98. A direct investment includes the "purchase, the creation or the extension
of any business, branch or individual enterprise; [and] [a]ll other operations
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within the category of foreign direct investment. 9 Prospective foreign investors must submit to the Ministry of Finance detailed
information about themselves, the size and nature of the investment and its beneficial effects on the French economy. In reviewing applications, the Ministry approves only those of obvious economic merit to France, such as those which introduce new technology, increase employment and favorably influence the balance of
trade.10 The Ministry enjoys wide discretion and characteristically
is very selective in its approval.
3. Canada.-Under the mechanism of its recently enacted Foreign Investment Review Act,' to insure that foreign investments
are or likely will be of significant benefit to Canada' the Canadian
Government' reviews the establishment of all new businesses, the
expansion of established businesses, the expansion of established
foreign-controlled entities into unrelated fields, and foreign acquisitions of 50 per cent or more of the voting stock of Canadian enterprises, which rebuttably constitutes control, 04 by "non-eligible
persons."'0 5 Following required notice by a foreign investor of plans
which alone or together with others, concurrently or consecutively, have the effect
of permitting a person or persons to acquire or increase the control of a company
• * . whatever may be its form, or to assure the expansion of such company
already controlled by them." Torem & Craig, supra note 97, at 286 (emphasis
omitted). Exempt from the authorization requirement is an initial acquisition of
less than 20% of the stock of a French company that is quoted on the stock
exchange (La Bourse). 3 CCH Cormi. MKT. REP. 22, 655 (1974); R. Dicm, supra
note 97, at 27.
99. Torem & Craig, supra note 97, at 289-90.
100. The Ministry also favors those investments that help develop the nation's
less industrialized or economically backward regions, and those that demonstrate
the investor's willingness to cooperate closely with the government. The Ministry
may consult other governmental departments while making its decision about the
desirability of the investment, and then must act on the application no later than
two months after its receipt. R. Dicm, supra note 97, at 29, 72-92; Torem &
Craig, supra note 97, at 318-22.
101. Foreign Investment Review Act of 1973, 2 Eliz., c. 46 (Can.) [hereinafter
cited as FIRA].
102. FIRA §2(1).
103. The Review Act establishes a Foreign Investment Agency to supervise
this regulatory process. FIRA §7(1).
104. FIRA § §2(1), 3(2)(a), 3(3), 5(1), 6. A 50% or more ownership or acquisition of stock in a Canadian corporation gives rise to a conclusive presumption of
control. FIRA §3(3).
105. FIRA §3(1).
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for such an investment, the Foreign Investment Review Agency
determines whether the investment offers the benefits necessary
for approval by weighing it against five judgmental criteria,,0 6
among which are the degree and significance of Canadian participation in the proposed investment, and its effect on Canadian
productivity, technological development, and industrial competition. The Agency has wide investigative powers to accomplish its

task. 107
4. Strict Statutory Control-A Summary.-The stringent controls exercised by the governments of Japan, France and Canada
are products of political and economic forces that are not duplicated in West Germany and the United Kingdom. In Japan and
France, the governments long have used restrictions to inhibit the
growth of foreign direct investment. The level of this investment
in Japan, in particular, is markedly lower than in any other comparably industrialized society.' The Japanese perceived the necessity of protecting their economy from outside competition to
insure reconstruction following World War II, and consequently
adopted restrictions virtually prohibiting the entry of foreign capital and trade.0 9 The remarkable resurgence of Japanese economic
power almost without foreign investment only strengthened their
justification for governmental protection, which continued in full
force until 1967.110 Mounting world, particularly United States,
criticism demanding reciprocity for liberal trade policies and noting outright contradictions between Japanese investment statutes
and its international commitments under the Treaty of Friend106. FIRA §2(2).
107. FIRA §§14-17.
108. Japanese stocks held by foreigners, with participation in the management of the Japanese company in question, totalled $899,626,000 in March 1973.
MANUAL, supra note 85, at 28 (App. (4)). In West Germany at the end of 1972, in
contrast, 1700 foreign companies with German subsidiaries or branches had invested DM 26 million (approximately $10.6 million, according to the prevailing
currency exchange rates on May 10, 1974. Wall Street J., May 13, 1974, at 22,
col. 5). 3 CCH Comm. MKT. RFP., supra note 97, at
23, 151 (1973). The book
value of foreign direct investment in Canada in 1967, furthermore, stood at
$20,699,000. THE GoVERNmENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIREcr NVESTMENT IN CANADA
15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as THE GRAY REPORT].
109. DOING BusINEss, supra note 85, at 18.
110. Id. at 21-22; MANUAL, supra note 85, at 2.
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ship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States"' and
under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,' subsequently forced Japan to commence its current program of liberalization that will conclude in 1976.113
Several reasons, in turn, may be set forth for French policy toward foreign investment. First, governmental interference with
and regulation of business is an historical phenomenon in
France;"' some form of foreign exchange controls have existed
since 1939.111 Secondly, post-World War II French receptivity to
foreign direct investment in France yielded in the mid-1960's to
nationalist desires to tame foreign influence and insure its subordination to French national interests in the future.1 The publication
111. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan, Sept. 15,
1953, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2082, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. Criticism of Japanese policy
toward inward foreign direct investment has come primarily from the United
States because of the Treaty terms that mandate full liberalization of Japanese
law and national treatment in Japan for American investments and management
of companies. Id. at 1087; Michida, supra note 85, at 10, 21.
112. Convention of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, [1961] 2 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 [hereinafter cited
as OECD]. In this regard, note particularly the OECD Code of Liberalization of
Current Invisible Transactions and the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, which call upon member governments to abolish gradually all restrictions
on international capital movements. DOING BusiNEss, supra note 85, at 19.
113. Liberalization measures were effected in July 1967, March 1969, September 1970, and in May 1973, to expand the scope of automatic validation of the
acquisition of stocks by foreign investors for the purpose of participation in the
management of corporations. The Japanese Government currently plans to terminate its liberalization program on May 1, 1976, with controls maintained on the
extent of foreign participation in many industries. MANUAL, supra note 85, at 2,
22-24 (appendices that set forth the extent of present and future governmental
control).
114. The inclination of the French Government to interfere in both domestic
and foreign business dates back at least to the Physioeconomics of the eighteenth
century, and continues today in the Five-Year Plans. R. DicKIE, supra note 97,
at 28-30.
115. Id. at 22.
116. The lack of foreign exchange reserves and of investment following World
War II forced France to seek inward foreign investment. From the early 1960's
onward, however, French pride and fear of excessive foreign economic influence
as well as foreign political influence, triggered particularly by sizable layoffs of
employees in 1962 by Remington Rand and General Electric, gave rise to much
stricter investment controls than before. R. Dicum, supra note 97, at 67-72.
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of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrieber's Le D~fi Am~ricain in 1967,
warning of the danger of an American takeover of the French economy, characterized and helped create a massive and peculiarly
French reaction against foreign investment." 7 The French Government soon thereafter instituted the present regime of controls.''
Fearing the economic benefits accruing to its neighbors due to their
more liberal attitudes toward foreign capital, France not
surprisingly has advocated a restrictive Common Market investment policy." 9
Unlike Japan and France, Canada possessed virtually no direct
restrictions of foreign investment until 1973, when the government
acted to stop the growth of an existing level of foreign ownership
and control of economic activity that is unmatched in any other
similarly developed state.'20 Sixty per cent of Canadian manufacturing, for example, is controlled by foreigners, while in the petroleum and resource industries this level amazingly exceeds 90 per
cent. Equally startling is that approximately one-third of all economic activity in Canada is under foreign domination, with the
predominate share held by the United States. 2' These statistics,
together with a recent governmental study that concluded an exhaustive examination of the effects of foreign direct investment on
Canadian political and economic life with a recommendation for
immediate statutory controls,"'2 sparked latent Canadian nationalism and brought forth the Foreign Investment Review Act.
5. The United Kingdom.-Under the 1947 Exchange Control
Act,ln virtually all investment transactions between residents of
117.

J.-J. SERVAN-SHREEaER,LE DEFI AMEmCAI

(1967).

118. The principal statutory instruments of French policy toward inward foreign investment are the Law concerning Financial Relations with Foreign Countries, of Dec. 28, 1966, [1966] J.O. 11621; the Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967,
[1967] J.O. 1073, and the Arrete of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1074, both of
which implement the earlier law. R. DicKiE, supra note 97, at 25-28.
119. Id.at 72-74.
120. See THE GRAY REPORT.
121. Id. at 5. In addition, 65% of Canadian mining and smelting is foreign
controlled. United States interests control approximately 80% of the total foreign
domination in Canadian manufacturing and natural resources. Id.
122.

See THE GRAY REPORT.

123. The Exchange Control Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 14. See M. STEUER,
P. ABELL, J. GENNARD, M. PERLMAN, R. REES, B. ScooT & K. WALUS, THE IMPACT
OF FOREIGN DmECr INVESTMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 9:2, 9:5, 9:6 (1973)
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the United Kingdom and non-residents require prior approval from
either the Bank of England or the Treasury. As in the aforementioned nations, the British Government weighs the effect of a proposed inward direct investment on foreign exchange reserves, its
broader political and economic implications, and other nonstatutory and discretionary considerations. 4 To insure a beneficial
addition to foreign exchange reserves, the government ordinarily
demands that the amount of foreign currency used to finance the
investment be proportionate to the size of the interest acquired or
created." 5 In addition, any acquired firm that supplies more than
one-third of the total market for its commodity, or that holds more
than five million pounds in assets is regulated under the 1965
Monopolies and Mergers Act." 6 The government may also condition approval of an investment upon the fulfillment of certain
requirements. Few undertakings, however, have been thus conditioned, and in such cases the investors have complied readily to
avoid undesirable conflicts with the British Government and public opinion. 12 An investment that offers particularly desirable ef[hereinafter cited as THE STEuER REPORT]. The Exchange Control Act is the only
British legislation that is directed specifically at foreign investors, who otherwise
enjoy the same treatment that is given British firms. The Exchange Control Act,
furthermore, governs investors in the establishment of a new firm or subsidiary,
the acquisition of an existing company, and in the subsequent management of the
investor's financial affairs in Britain. The Exchange Control Act §§1, 2, 5(c), 6,
8, 9 and 30(2).
124. The rationale for these criteria rests on a quid pro quo argument: in
return for the right to invest in Britain, foreign investors should yield to the
British Government benefits in the form of additions to the foreign exchange
reserves. The discretionary criteria of acceptability generally also require that the
purchase price of an investment be a "fair consideration" for the assets acquired
by the foreign company, and that any further fixed assets financing should be
supplied by capital imports in an amount proportionate to the foreign share of
the company. Since joining the European Economic Community (EEC), the
United Kingdom has allowed unlimited access to British loans for subsidiaries in
Britain of companies directly owned by residents of EEC countries for direct
investment in the United Kingdom. The STEuER REPoRT 9:8-10, 9:12.
125. A major exception to this requirement occurs when the subsidiary's activities "promise special advantage" to the United Kingdom, as when the subsidiary plans to locate in a depressed area. Id. at 9:8(a).
126. Any such application may be referred by the Department of Trade and
Industry to the Monopolies Commission. Id. at 9:16.
127. In the acquisition of majority control of British Rootes, Ltd. by Chrysler,
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fects on the British economy, such as location in a rural or depressed region may even be granted special favorable consideration.'28 In fact, despite the available restrictions, the government
has approved virtually all inward foreign direct investment. 29
6. West Germany.-Germany exercises perhaps the least control on the inflow of foreign capital of any of the nations considered
in this Note. Governmental approval is not required for any foreign
direct investment, although foreign investors must report their activity to the government. 3 ' Of course, foreign investors, like German investors, must still comply with the 1973 Amendment Act,
which greatly strengthened the merger and monopoly controls and
which is applicable to all business entities, foreign and domestic,
1 31
operating within Germany.

7. Liberal Statutory Regulations-A Summary.-The German
and British liberal policies toward foreign direct investment illustrate governmental attitudes that recognize the positive benefits to
a host country from the entry of foreign capital. On the part of
Germany, a post-World War I adherence to a free market economy, freie Marktwirtschaft, together with a desire to use foreign
capital to advance post-war reconstruction, underlay the German
the requested undertakings of Chrysler included the maintenance of a majority
of British directors on the Rootes board, a progressive increase in exports, the
nomination of a British Rootes director to each of the boards of Simca (French
Chrysler) and Chrysler International, and the retention of 15% of the equity of
Rootes by shareholders other than Chrysler. Though the British Government
possesses no instruments with which to enforce these undertakings, it has enjoyed
great success in obtaining cooperation from foreign investors. Id. at 9:18-19.
128. Id. at 9:8(a).
129. THE STEUER REPORT, at 9:12.
130. 3 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP., supra note 97, at 23, 156 (1973).
131. Domestic or foreign parties to a German merger or acquisition must

report the transaction to the Federal Cartel Office if 20% or more of the market
in a certain sector thereby comes under the control of a single enterprise, or if the

entities participating in the transaction together have sales of DM 500 or more,
or a combined work force of 10,000 or more. Id. at

23, 510A. The acquisition of

25% or more of the stock of another entity similarly requires a report to the
German Government. Id. A planned merger in which two or more of the partici-

pants enjoy annual sales of DM 1 billion or more necessitates advance reporting.
Id. at 23, 510B. The Federal Cartel Office has special power to dissolve or
prohibit any planned or completed merger that creates or strengthens a "market
dominating position." Id. at 23, 510C.
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receptivity to foreign direct investment. 2 This governmental policy has stimulated a massive influx of foreign investment, totalling
DM 26 billion by the end of 1972 and representing the operations
of 1700 foreign-controlled companies, of which approximately 1200
were American-owned. 33 A recurring and chronic balance of payments surplus forced the West German Government in 1972 to
impose restrictions of further inward foreign direct investment to
prevent the inflow of speculative capital; 4 however Germany rescinded these provisions in early 1974."3
The liberally applied British regulations governing foreign capital investment are a product of an historic national posture that
encourages free trade and the creation of substantial British capital holdings in other nations, including the United States. 3' Understandably, then, foreign capital constitutes a large and accelerating position in the British economy.'3 7 At least 75 per cent of this
investment originated in the United States, and all sectors of the
American economy have established capital interests in the United
Kingdom. 3 8 Of late, however, this sizeable foreign corporate presence in Britain has provoked a number of evaluative studies, which
are of particular interest to Americans who fear the expansion of
foreign direct investment in the United States. The most authoritative of these studies, the Steuer Report, was prepared under the
auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry' and concentrated its evaluation of the effect of foreign direct investment in
seven areas-balance of payments, technology, labor relations,
monopoly and competitive power, regional economic growth, and
132. 3 CCH CoimM. MKT. REP., supra note 97, at 23, 116 (1973).
133. See note 108 supra; 3 CCH Comm. MiK. REP., supra note 97, at 23, 151
(1973).
134. 3 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP., at
23, 124 & 23, 151 (1973).
135. CCH EuRoMRKET NEWs, Feb. 5, 1974, at 3.
136. At the end of 1972, British entities held approximately $4.581 billion in
American direct investments, or 32% of all foreign direct investment in the United
States. FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at Table V. Total British direct foreign
investments in other countries is greater than £10,720 million. BRrrISH INFORMATION SERVICES, BRITAIN's EXTERNAL TRADE AND PAYMENTS 18 (1973).
137. The book value of all direct foreign investment in the United Kingdom,
excluding oil, banking and insurance investments, is £3980. Id. at 18.
138. Id.; THE STEUER REPORT at 5:10-16, 5:20.
139. See note 123 supra.
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national sovereignty.'40 In brief, the Steuer Report found no present harm to Britain from foreign direct investment. Indeed, it concluded that overall the effect is favorable."' The Steuer Report
observed in particular that notwithstanding the difficulty in measuring the impact of foreign direct investment on the nation's balance of payments, such investment nevertheless does contribute
4
approximately a two per cent increase in real domestic income."
Noting the complex indicia involved in an assessment of technological impact, the authors of the Steuer Report concluded that
none of the traditional arguments exactly identify the diverse and
apparently neutral effect of foreign capital on the development of
British technology."' In addition, the largely oligopolistic foreign
firms that have invested in Britain have posed a strong deterrent
to domestic monopolies and may have increased the level of competition. 44' Foreign direct investment, the Steuer Report noted,
also raised employment and increased wages, particularly when
the investment was applied in economically weak areas.' The
authors found practical foreign control of British subsidiaries existed in fewer instances than was feared.' Lastly, the investigation
not only produced little evidence to indicate a loss of national
sovereignty from this investment, but it also suggested that such
foreign capital actually increases host country options by raising
domestic income and by introducing investment that is naturally
more accountable than domestic capital to governmental and public influence.' 47 Except for an overall limit on foreign direct investment in Britain, the Steuer Report suggested no further governmental regulation of foreign investment. Indeed, the only affirmative action in this regard counselled by the Steuer Report's authors
was a much intensified monitoring of foreign capital activity in
Britain to remedy the present lack of thorough data in this area.'
140. THE STEuER REPORT, at chs. 2 (balance of payments), 3 (technology), 4
(labor relations), 5 (monopoly power), 6 (regional aspects), 7 (control of
subsidiaries), and 8 (national sovereignty).
141. Id. at 1:44-51.
142. Id. at 1:45, 2:1-33.
143. Id. at 1:26, 3:1-42.
144. THm STEuER REPORT, at 1:32-35, 5:1-49.
145. Id. at 1:36-38, 6:1-55.
146. Id. at 1:39.
147. Id. at 1:40-43, 8:1-37.
148. Id. at 1:50-51, 9:21-22.
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THE CURRENT RISE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES

A.

Causes

The evident increase in direct foreign investment in the United
States may be traced to five factors: (1) the increasingly obvious
economic advantages of producing in the American market, espe-

cially for those abroad who have exported to the United States in
the past; (2) the search for scarce raw materials, food and fuel; (3)
the stimulus to foreign investors by both state and federal governments; (4) the devaluations of the dollar and other recent changes
in the world economic equilibrium; and (5) the growing Arab and
oil-producing nations' monetary reserves that need outlets for investment. First, the economic advantages and potential of the
American market make it an obvious place for expansion and exploitation. The sheer size, growth, and unrestricted flow of goods
possible in the United States are a lure to the increasing number
of foreign entities and multinational corporations that have the
ability and desire to expand.' In addition, the huge labor resources and technological expertise found in the United States,
such as automation, instant communications and computers, provide opportunities for tremendous expansion and economic capabilities not duplicated elsewhere. For those exporters who manufacture abroad for sale in the United States, the advantages are
especially apparent. A location nearer their market, as United
States multinationals long ago found, may considerably reduce
expenses, increase familiarity with the market and lessen the impact of any restrictions that the United States may impose on
trade imports. Americans are also more likely to buy goods produced domestically, though in foreign-owned factories, than those
produced abroad. The economic reasons alone, are great, then, for
foreigners to seek American facilities for production. Secondly, in
their efforts to compensate for scarce domestic resources, other
nations have found the United States at least a partial source for
their needs. Japan, in particular, has sought to assure its future
149. The sheer size and rate of growth of the United States economy were
cited by virtually all firms that responded to the Arpan and Ricks survey as being
the most important reasons for coming to the United States. Arpan Statement,
supra note 2, at 4.

Fall 1974]

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S.

timber, food and fuel needs by purchasing interests in these commodities in the United States. 50 Thirdly, state and federal governments have actively encouraged direct inward capital investment
through foreign advertising, trade seminars and fairs, and development offices in foreign capitals." ' For example, state development
agencies'5 2 participated in an "Invest in the U.S.A." seminar in
Tokyo and Osaka in May 1973, which was co-sponsored by the
American and Japanese Governments, and at least twelve states
maintain foreign development offices to attract and assist foreign
investors.'5 3 To supplement these efforts the states offer incentives
such as low-cost industrial sites, tax breaks and labor training
programs.'54 Fourthly, the two devaluations of the dollar in the
past three years'55 have altered the United States economic
position vis-a-vis its world trading partners and made America a
much more attractive place in which to manufacture and sell. By
reducing the value of the dollar 17.16 percent from its preDecember 1971 level, the American Government considerably lowered the comparative cost of production in the United States. 5' In
150. Japanese interests have invested chiefly in seafood, timber and pulp in
Alaska. Stitt Statement, supra note 7, at 5. The Japanese also are investing
throughout the world in land and agricultural products because it depends so
heavily on imports for its food supply. Since the United States is its major source
of food, Japan naturally has great interest in insuring the stability and continuity
of the source through direct investment in the United States. Id. at 10-11.
151. See Stitt Statement, supra note 7, at 7-8; Statement of Frank Alspaugh,
Director of the Virginia Division of Industrial Development, and Chairman of the
International Committee of the National Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA) at Hearings on ForeignDirect Investment in the United States
Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 5, 1974 (pre-publication transcript)
[hereinafter cited as Alspaugh Statement], at 2-4.
152. Stitt Statement, supra note 7, at 7-8. In the past two years, approximately twenty individual state, city and county missions have visited Japan to
encourage investment in the United States. Id. at 8.
153. Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and
Puerto Rico. Alspaugh Statement, supra note 151, at 3.
154. Stitt Statement, supra note 7, at 8.
155. These devaluations occurred in December 1971, and in February 1973.
Wall Street J., Apr. 5, 1974, at 18, col. 1.
156. N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1971, at 1, col. 8; Id. Feb. 13, 1973, at 45, col. 4;
Wall Street J., Apr. 19, 1974, at 4, col. 2.
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addition, skyrocketing world inflation and burgeoning labor costs
outside the United States have contributed to this new advantage. 15 7 This trend is highlighted by the recently negotiated 30
per cent increase in Japanese wage rates following the annual
"spring offensive" by Japanese labor. ' American realty costs,
especially as compared to those in Japan, arQ now especially competitive in the world market because of both the devaluation and
the afnount of available land. 59 Coupled with devaluation, the fall
in American stock prices during the past two years has made
United States securities even cheaper and foreign corporate purchases of American stock a much more viable proposition.10
Fifthly, the 400 per cent increase in the world price of oil"' during
the past year has precipitated a huge and growing accumulation
of monetary reserves by the major oil producing nations and much
of this bounty has been invested in the United States.' The stabil157. See note 11 supra. While United States labor costs rose 1% in the first
six months of 1973 above the comparable period in 1972, Japan's labor expenses
jumped 11.6%, measured in United States dollars. According to the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics, between 1969 and 1972, United States labor costs rose
an average of 1.8% annually, while those of Japan climbed at a much sharper rate
of 4.1% per year. Wall Street J., Jan. 21, 1974, at 6, col. 2.
158. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1974, at 15, col. 1.
159. Property in downtown Los Angeles, for example, sells at $50 per square
foot, while similar land in Tokyo sells at $900 per square foot. Among the Japanese purchases that are concentrated on the West Coast are the Beverly Wiltshire
Hotel in Beverly Hills, and numerous golf courses, apartment buildings and expensive homes. Wall Street J., Jan. 21, 1974, at 6, col. 2.
160.

See note 12 supra.

161. The posted price of crude oil stood at approximately $11.63 per barrel on
March 15, 1974, a 400% increase from a year earlier. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1974,
at 45, col. 7. The posted price is a mythical number on which government taxes
and royalties are computed. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 11, col. 1.
162. The oil revenues of the Arab oil producing nations should soar from a
total of $22 billion in 1973 to between $85 billion and $110 billion in 1974, and
will create a pool of approximately $50 billion for foreign investment. Chase
Manhattan Bank estimates, furthermore, that by 1980 Arab foreign currency
reserves should swell to more than $400 billion from a total of $5 billion in 1970.
Wall Street J., Mar. 5, 1974, at 1, col. 6. The combined GNP of all the Arab
producers should reach $74 billion in 1974, double the figure for 1973. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 20, 1974, at 59, col. 2. Per capita income in the Sheikdom of Abu Dhabi, in
addition, will rise to $45,000 in 1974, compared to $6,127 in the United States.
Id. Changing their traditionally ultraconservative investment policy, the Arabs
are evincing interest in United States real estate, banks and joint ventures, particularly in energy-related fields. Wall Street J., Mar. 5, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
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ity and growth of the American economy have particularly attracted the attention of the Arabs, and they have reportedly decided to abandon their traditionally conservative investment goals
in favor of more growth-oriented ventures, which abound in the
63
United States.
B.

The Current Extent of Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States

The Commerce Department's book value of direct foreign investment in the United States stood at approximately 14.363 billion
dollars on January 1, 1973, compared to a 94.031 billion dollar book
value for direct United States investments abroad.'64 The United
Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland are the chief
sources of this inward investment. 6 ' Of this total book value, foreign capital invested in manufacturing counted for half, and petroleum, one-fourth."' Approximately 1200 foreign companies engage
in American manufacturing, mining and petroleum production.'67
New foreign direct investment is concentrated chiefly in four areas:
electrical machinery, non-electrical machinery, chemicals and scientific equipment.' 8 Moreover, the vast majority of investments
have taken the form of newly created subsidiaries or direct manufacturing operations of existing foreign companies, funded from
abroad and created without any United States Government assistance.' 6 ' United States citizens constitute virtually all of the employees of these firms, and sit as presidents or members of the
boards of directors in roughly half of these ventures. 70 All of the
investors previously had invested directly in at least one other
163. Id.
164. FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at A Table 1. The accuracy of the
calculation for foreign direct investment in the United States is subject to some
dispute. Messrs. Arpan and Ricks estimate that this total should be $38 billion,
and ascribe the Commerce Department's figure to certain weaknesses in its investigatory methods. Arpan Statement, supra note 2, at 7.
165. FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at Table V.
166. Id. at Table VI.
167. Arpan Statement, supra note 2, at 2. Messrs. Arpan and Ricks estimate
that nearly 1500 firms in the United States are foreign controlled. Id.
168. Id. at 5.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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foreign country before making their American investment and had
had prior experience in exporting to the United States. 71 During
1973, the level of foreign direct investment in the United States
rose much more sharply than in 1972 and increased by more than
three billion dollars., The leading sources of foreign direct investment in the United States in this period were Japan, Canada, West
Germany and Britain.' 73 More than two-thirds of these investmenti involved the construction of entirely new facilities, most of
which constituted an initial direct capital investment in the
United States.' The chemical, electrical-equipment and textile
industries paced this growth, which occurred most heavily in the
Southeastern states and California. 175 Typical major new projects
include a 175 million dollar South Carolina plant for the Michelin
Tire Company of France, plans for a 100 million dollar Volvo automobile factory in Virginia' 7 and the 100 million dollar petrochemical complex in Texas of the American subsidiary of Farbwerke
Hoechst AG, the West German chemical concern.' 77 Foreign direct

stock acquisitions in American corporations accounted for a much
smaller percentage of foreign direct investment, but has included
the takeover of numerous well known entities such as Gimbels
Brothers' department stores, Grand Union Company's supermarkets, TraveLodge International, Inc.'s motels and Standard Oil
Company of Ohio. 78 Foreign investors have also demonstrated an
increasingly strong interest in real estate. The Japanese have
moved with particular force in this sphere in western United
States, and purchased several major hotels and reportedly acquired more than 300 million dollars alone in realty and resort
171. Id.
172. The Conference Board, a private nonprofit research organization,
reached this conclusion based on the analysis by David Bauer, an international
economist on its staff. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 39, col. 7. This figure is
considerably larger than the $2 billion unofficially estimated by the Commerce
Department, and demonstrates the uncertainty of present statistics and information. Wall Street J., Jan. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
173. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 39, col. 7.
174. Id. at 39, col. 7 and 41, col. 1.
175. Id. at 41, col. 1.
176. Id.
177. See note 5 supra.
178. See note 6 supra.
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properties in Hawaii.'70 Increasingly evincing a similar inclination
are the Arabs, who may invest at least one billion dollars in United
States real estate during the next two years."' Direct Kuwaiti investments of this nature already total 100 million dollars. The
Kuwaiti Investment Company, jointly owned by the Kuwait Government and private Kuwaiti investors, has purchased a half interest in the Atlanta Hilton Center and plans to turn its 17.3 million
dollar investment in Kiaweh Island, South Carolina into a 100
million dollar resort modeled on its neighbor, Hilton Head Island.' 1 Likewise, the Shah of Iran has recently purchased a New
York office building.2 The above examples are but a few of the
many realty investments of this sort.
The prospects for continued growth in inward direct investment
are mixed and necessarily dependent on the vagaries of the world
economic equilibrium and its determinants. Continued instability
of the United States dollar and trade balance and the greater stability of balance of payments in foreign economies, naturally will
be a key factor in future growth in this regard. Germany is in an
especially strong position in that respect while the recent weakness
of the yen has caused Japan to restrict the purchase of foreign
securities by her citizens.' The extraordinary wage increases recently won by Japanese workers, however, and the continued governmental policy favoring direct capital expenditures abroad,
argue for the probable continuation of expanding Japanese investment in the United States. The changes in other basic economic
considerations, such as productivity, unit labor cost and technological developments, which are all partly dependent on the balance of payments, are difficult to ascertain, but the size and
growth of the United States economy, together with the relative
natural resource security of the United States and the continued
growth of foreign firms having the expertise and size necessary to
179. See note 8 supra.
180. Wall Street J., Mar. 5, 1974, at 33, col. 6.
181. Id., Mar. 5, 1974, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1974, at §F, at 15,
col. 4.
182. Wall Street J., Mar. 5, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
183. Stitt Statement, supra note 7, at 6. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government will continue to give priority to projects involving the exploration of petroleum and other natural resources, as well as investment in manufacturing abroad
in order to maintain or expand markets. Id.
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expand into the United States, likely should contribute to a sizeable growth of foreign direct investment in the United States in the
near term. The inability of the oil producing nations to absorb
their wealth, despite intensive efforts to use their new found riches
in rapid domestic economic development, necessitates foreign investment.""4

V. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The legislative proposals submitted separately by Representatives John Dent and John Moss would restrict only the acquisition
by foreign persons or entities of securities in existing American
corporations that are registered under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934. These bills, therefore, would not affect in any way the
creation by foreign investors of subsidiaries or wholly owned direct
manufacturing operations. Representative Dent's proposal, the
stricter of the two, is known as the "Foreign Investors Limitation
Act."' 8 The addition of section 12(A) to the 1934 Act would prohibit in the future any non-citizen, or United States entity that is
owned or controlled by a non-citizen, from acquiring directly or
indirectly more than five per cent of the voting securities of any
issuer that is registered under section 12 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.188 Any such person who, at the time of the
Foreign Investors Limitation Act's passage, controlled more than
five per cent of the voting securities of such an issuer could thereafter acquire no more of those securities.' Moreover, any noncitizen or foreign-controlled United States entity would have to
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to its
acquisition of the securities of any registered American issuer. 8'
The purpose of the Dent bill is to counteract the dangers of foreign
control of American industry and encourage the diversification of
foreign investment in domestic industry. 8 9 The legislation drafted
by Representative Moss, entitled the "Energy and Defense Indus184.
185.
8951].
186.
of more
187.
188.
189.

See note 161 supra.
H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), at preamble [hereinafter H.R.
H.R. 8951, at §3. This prohibition would also extend to the acquisition
than 35% of the nonvoting securities of such a company. H.R. 8951.
H.R. 8951.
H.R. 8951.
H.R. 8951, at §2.
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try Production Act," 9 ' is less restrictive than the Dent bill. This
bill would make it illegal for a non-citizen of the United States, or
by an entity that is owned or controlled by a non-citizen, to control
any American issuer, registered under section 12 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, that is engaged in an energy or defense
industry."' For purposes of the Moss bill, "control" would mean
the direct or indirect ownership of ten per cent of the voting securities of the American issuer, although the Securities and Exchange
Commission in its discretion could lower this figure in special
cases.'92 An issuer engaged in the energy industry would be one
whose principal business is the production or processing of crude
oil, residual fuel oil, refined petroleum products, shale, natural
gas, coal, geothermal steam, uranium and electricity.'93 A "defense
industry" issuer would be one that derives twenty per cent or more
of its gross revenues either directly or indirectly from contracts
with the armed services or the United States Department of Defense or whose products the Department of Defense designates as
vital to the national defense. 19 4 After appropriate notice and oppor-

tunity for hearing, however, either the Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration or the Secretary of Defense could exempt an issuer engaged in the energy or defense industries, respectively, from the prohibitions of this bill if the Administrator or
Secretary should determine that such an exemption would not
adversely affect either the production or supply of energy within
the United States, or the national defense.'"
VI.

AN EVALUATION OF THE DEsnIABiLITY OF FURTHER UNITED
STATES STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS

The legislation restricting further foreign stock purchases in and
control of United States businesses offered separately by Representatives John Dent and John Moss, are symptomatic of the apprehension in the United States about the rapidly expanding level
190.
12040].
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

H.R. 12040, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), at preamble [hereinafter H.R.
H.R.
H.R.
H.R.
H.R.
H.R.

12040,
12040,
12040,
12040,
12040,

at
at
at
at
at

§2.
§2.
§2.
§2.
§2.

182

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8.:147

of foreign direct investment. Since this phenomenon is of extremely recent origin comparatively little statistical or evaluative
information exists with which to ascertain its desirability. Consequently, the angry and worried response of the public, the press
and members of Congress, which has prompted these bills, has
been free from either statistical verification or refutation. The urgency with which the public and Representatives Dent and Moss
have reacted, nevertheless, demands an evaluation of foreign direct investment in the United States and of the merit of further
statutory restrictions on its growth.
The domestic economic benefits that the United States derives
from the inward flow of foreign direct capital are substantial. New
jobs are created and new technology is introduced that raises workers' skill levels, wages and overall productivity."' Foreign investment such as the Sony plant in San Diego'9 7 also increases competition, lowers prices and causes at least short-term improvement in
the balance of payments by increasing the flow of money into the
United States. Tax revenues, in addition, rise as new factories
contribute to local tax bases. Moreover, the interest shown by
foreign manufacturers in locating in the Southeastern states hastens the development of this less advanced area."'8 Foreign funds
supplement the existing scarce investment resources that are essential to the expansion of the United States economy.'99 The beneficial economic effects of inward foreign investment also extend
indirectly to the multitude of domestic suppliers, transporters and
distributors, among others, who are part of the commercial process. The opportunities, therefore, are great for foreign direct investment to have a constructive impact on the American economy.
196. FarmerStatement, supra note 9, at 3-5.
197. Sony's San Diego factory produces 25,000 color televisions and 5,000
record players monthly with a labor force of 350 workers that will increase to 600
following present plant expansion. See, Stitt Statement, supra note 7, at 3.
198. South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina and Virginia currently are very attractive to foreign investors. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 41,

col. 1.
199. Chauncey E. Schmidt, vice chairman of the First National Bank of Chicago recently stated: "There is hardly a crisis today .... where the wise allocation of the world's capital resources could not contribute greatly to a solution [to]
. .apparent global shortage of the financial underpinning that is the first prerequisite for a healthy world economy. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1974, §3, at 2, col. 8.
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That the effects of foreign direct investments would be beneficial
is substantiated by the positive conclusions found in the British
Steuer Report.
One may argue, on the other hand, that opportunity also exists
for foreign investors to gain control of whole sectors of the nation's
economic life, as United States multinational corporations have
done elsewhere, 20 and that foreign investment will detrimentally

affect the long-term United States balance of payments through
the outflow of dividends and profits to foreign corporate parents.
The inevitability of these suppositions must be questioned. Despite the obvious injury wrought to the balance of payments by
dividend payments abroad, inward direct investment will substitute goods produced domestically and by American labor for those
formerly imported, and may even create sources for exports. Either
or both of these beneficial consequences might well overcome longrange deleterious effects. The net beneficial impact on the balance
of payments, 01 resulting from foreign direct investment is affirmed
by the Steuer Report, which found a two per cent increase in domestic per capita income in Britain. Moreover, the likelihood of
future foreign dominance in American industrial sectors is extremely remote. Existing foreign direct investment in the United
States controls merely one-fourth of one per cent of American corporate assets, and is scattered in many fields. 22 The entire 1973

inward foreign direct investment equalled only two per cent of
American expenditure during the same period on business, plants
and equipment. 23 The prospect, therefore, of any foreign economic

takeover is virtually nil. Should such a threat arise, however, the
existing restrictions and statutory powers that the government already possesses could be effective instruments to prevent entry
into a number of fields, or to obstruct monopolization and undue
influence in others, and if necessary, the federal government could
resort to nationalization.
200. United States companies control the following percentages of the auto
market in selected European nations: 38% in Germany, 12% in Italy, 20% in
Sweden and 45% in Great Britain. In comparison, Germany contributed only
5.5% of the cars registered in the United States in 1972.
201.

THE STEuER REPoRT, at 1:45.

202. In contrast, American multinationals in Europe own approximately 5%
of total European corporate assets. FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at 11.
203. Id.
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Future growth in the United States of foreign direct investment
depends on the product of many widely fluctuating factors that
suggest an uncertain and uneven growth, consequently further reducing the threat of extreme foreign economic influence. The past
sporadic growth of foreign investment in the United States" 4
should alone temper these fears. The volatibility of the world economy, in addition, argues strongly for the same conclusion. The
fluctuating strength of the dollar, together with the occurrence of
unfavorable foreign economic indices, such as negative Japanese
trade balances,"' which have forced the Japanese Government to
impose foreign investment restrictions,"0 may dampen the flow of
foreign capital to America. The prospect of massive and unified
United States investment of Arab oil money, in turn, must yield
to certain qualifying evidence. First, notwithstanding the lure of
the apparent stability and prospective growth of the American
market, the fear of anti-Arab sentiment among the American people and the remote chance of United States expropriation of investments has affected Arab thinking, and should cause them to exercise circumspection and discretion in their United States investments. 071 Secondly, historical evidence also indicates that the multinational sources of Arab investment will fail to effectively coordinate their economic power. Thirdly, all of the oil-producing nations recognize the need to develop economically and diversify
their economies to protect against the dilution of their oil resources.0 ' This development will tie up a huge share of the oil
204. Between 1960 and 1972, net annual foreign direct investment in the
United States peaked at $1.45 billion in 1970, and then approached its low point
for that period the next year, when the nation experienced a net outflow of $385
million in foreign investment. FlaniganStatement, supra note 1, at Table II.
205. Japan experienced a January 1974 trade deficit of $784 million, followed
by a $650 million deficit in February. These deficits were the first for Japan in
three years. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 42, col. 4-5.
206. See note 182 supra and accompanying text.
207. Aware of the controversy surrounding growing Japanese interest in direct
investment in the United States, the Arabs fear a similar backlash and a possible
freeze on Arab assets in United States banks. Wall Street J., Mar. 5, 1974, at 33,

col. 6.
208. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1974, at 53, col. 5. Leonard Silk of the New York
Times suggests that the Arabs have developed a five point strategy for the future:
(1) maximize oil profits; (2) keep the oil price high; (3) maintain world dependence on oil; (4) maximize domestic capital accumulation; and (5) achieve lasting
diversified economic development. Id.
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income, and is a process in which United States multinationals
shall participate and, therefore, increase United States influence

in the oil world. 209 Lastly, much Arab money will likely be distrib-

uted through aid programs to the underdeveloped world. Iran, Algeria and Libya, supported by the World Bank and the United
States, already have moved cautiously toward creating an Arab
fund for economic development. 20 Kuwait itself supports its own
existing 600 million dollar assistance fund. 211 With such evidence,

therefore, one must not yield to an ad hominem conclusion that
foreign direct investment is about to take over the American economy.
The political arguments against new restrictions on inward foreign direct investment are equally cogent. In a number of ways, a
program of further controls would weaken the nation's liberal foreign trade policy of encouraging economic and political interdependence in the Western world. Further statutory restrictions
would contradict the goals of the GATT and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development to maximize the flow of
world trade and investment. The United States would contravene
its bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation in
which each signatory guarantees, with only limited exceptions,
national treatment for foreign investors. The bargaining position
of the United States in the proposed new round of tariff reduction
negotiations under the GATT naturally would be less forceful than
otherwise, if the government should adopt contradictory investment controls. The reactions of United States world trading partners might be especially harmful; after tolerating the inflow of
massive American capital since the last world war, these nations
would likely find hypocritical any efforts now to restrict investment flowing from these nations to the United States. The United
Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, the prime recipients of Ameri209. The Saudi Arabian Government has approached several United States
companies with plans for joint construction there of energy and petrochemical
projects. Wall Street J., Apr. 10, 1974, at 5, col. 1.
210. The strongest support for this proposal comes from Iran, which suggested
in February 1974 that a $2-3 billion fund be jointly created by the oil exporting
and Western industrialized nations. Additionally Iran has already offered $600
million to the International Monetary Fund for short-term loans and aid to developing nations. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1974, at 7, col. 1.
211. Wall Street J., Apr. 8, 1974, at 8, col. 3.
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can capital, particularly would be offended at legislation such as
the Dent and Moss proposals, which would prohibit direct stock
ownership at levels much more restrictive than their own regulations. The Japanese, who were forced by the United States to
liberalize their investment regulations, would also react unfavorably. Retaliation to new restrictions, a not unlikely prospect, would
severely damage the security and productivity of American investment abroad and possibly portend a destructive wave of trade
protection that could cripple world trade. New statutory restrictions on foreign direct investment, therefore, could undermine
United States credibility and sever the now tenuous ties of Western policital unity. On the contrary, at least one major dividend
to American foreign policy from an unrestricted inflow of foreign
capital would be greater cooperation between the United States
and the Arab nations. American investment of Arab oil money
naturally could foster a greater identity of economic interest between the United States and the Arabs through a mutual desire
for a stable and healthy American economy. The most decisive
result of this situation could be greater United States leverage in
the Arab world.
One must conclude, then, that any discriminatory restrictions
against foreign direct investment at this time, such as proposed by
Representatives Dent and Moss, at best would be premature, and
at worst dangerous to United States economic and political interests. The sudden growth of this influx of foreign capital, the adverse public reaction to it and the paucity of information with
which to judge its effect on the United States, however, all suggest
the need for some sort of response. The ramifications of any governmental action still are sufficiently unclear and potentially dangerous that extreme care must be taken in this regard. Senator
Inouye's proposal for an exhaustive survey and evaluation of current foreign direct investment in the United States212 is the wisest
course at this time. The knowledge, which such a survey could
produce, far outweighs any intervening harm that more foreign
investment could produce. Another course, simultaneously would
be a multilateral convention creating a world investment code to
govern rights of host and investor nations and the rights of private
212.
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investors as well. Though a recent phenomenon in the United
States, foreign direct investment already has so greatly influenced
the economies of most other nations that its impact demands a
global response.
Gregory E. Andrews

